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Internal Revenue Code Section 198, The Tax 
Incentive for Brownfield Redevelopment:  
A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing 
Kashif Haque* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the world advances, both industrially and technologically, 
society must endure the negative side effects of such advancements.1 
Most notably, urban sprawl and decay produce deplorable living 
conditions in urban areas.2 A major component of urban sprawl and 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2001. I would like to dedicate this Note 
to my family, Tanveer and Nelofer Kirmani, Nay Haque, and most of all Syed and Najima 
Amin. 
 1. See Peter K. Johnson, Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: 1997 Superfund 
Amendments: Will it Solve the Liability Problem and How Will This Affect Massachusetts?, 31 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1269, 1272 (1997) (discussing how industrialization produced not only jobs 
and technology, but also chemical wastes and manufacturing by-products that, when not 
disposed of properly, cause serious environmental harm).  
 2. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional 
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 69 (1999). Buzbee argues that the lack of inner-city 
investment causes a loss of refurbished residential housing which leads to decreasing property 
values, and in turn harms vulnerable residents such as children. Id. The declining property 
values lead to a decreased tax base, and illustrates the need for higher tax rates to compensate 
for lost revenue and to fund social services. Id. at 69-70. All the lost revenues and lack of 
investment leads to deteriorating housing, and is often accompanied by the departure of local 
employers and industry. Id. at 70 (citing KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 266-71 (1985)); see generally Georgette C. 
Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Redistribution of Poverty-Related 
Expenses, 47 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 6-7 (1995) (describing the dilemma of 
municipal officials arising from the region’s concentration of economically challenged residents 
in the inner-city). Consequently, the tax base of the city is disproportionately less than that of 
the area’s suburbs. Id. at 7.  
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decay is a phenomenon known as “brownfields.”3 According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), brownfields are sites in 
urban areas that are either abandoned, idled, or under-utilized 
because environmental contamination complicates redevelopment of 
those sites.4 The recent trend of investors developing outside of urban 
areas compounds the problem by building on unpolluted land instead 
of rehabilitating brownfields.5 Investors leave urban areas because 
they fear the potential liability of operating on or owning a 
contaminated site.6 Instead, they opt for non-polluted, suburban sites 
known as “greenfields.”7 While choosing a greenfield can be a sound 
business decision, the lack of investment in the inner-city results in 
reduced opportunities for local residents.8 Residents of the inner-city, 
where brownfields are found, are often members of economically 
vulnerable minority groups.9 Therefore, the lack of investment in the 
urban center erodes the job market and tax base of the inner-city, 
broadening the gap between the rich and the poor.10 Furthermore, the 
 
 3. Multiple Factors Should Shape Choice of Technology for Brownfields, 27 Env’t Rep. 
(BNA) No. 48, at 2489 (Apr. 11, 1997) (explaining that there are as many as 650,000 
brownfield sites throughout the United States and the average remediation effort for a 
brownfield site is $250,000); Brownfields: Agenda on Brownfields Shows Government at its 
Best, Browner Tells Conference, Daily Env’t Rep.; (BNA) No. 172, at A-3 (Sept. 5, 1997).  
 4. Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, The Brownfields Economic 
Redevelopment Initiative: Proposal Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment Demonstration 
Pilots, EPA No. 500-F-97-156, 3 (Oct. 1997); see also Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental 
Liability and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 
10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 65 (1996). 
 5. Tax Incentive Will Help Eliminate Urban Eyesores, Gore Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) 
(Feb. 5, 1996), available at LEXIS 1996 DTR 23 d9. Vice President Gore explained in a speech 
to the National Association of State Development Agencies that contaminated urban sites have 
not been redeveloped due to “‘the fear’ associated with the liability of owning contaminated 
sites.” Id.; see also Buzbee, supra note 2, at 69. 
 6. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional 
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (1997).  
 7. Douglas A. McWilliams, Comment, Environmental Justice and Industrial 
Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 714 
(1994). Unlike a brownfield a greenfield site is located upon land that is untainted by 
contamination because it has never been used for manufacturing or commercial activities. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Mark R. Rank, The Racial Injustice of Poverty, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 95 
(1999); JUST TRANSPORTATION: DISMANTLING RACE AND CLASS BARRIERS TO MOBILITY 25-
26 (Robert D. Bullard & Glenn S. Johnson eds., 1997). See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, 
Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1998) (book review). 
 10. See Zelinsky, supra note 9. 
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increasing demand for greenfields results in the bulldozing of forests 
and increased urban sprawl. As a result, cities must build new traffic 
infrastructures away from public transportation routes and the 
resulting longer commutes to work translates into increased 
pollution.11 
The federal government is attempting to redevelop troubled urban 
areas to promote commercial activity and thereby rejuvenate the 
inner-city.12 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) was designed to 
remedy environmental problems, such as brownfield sites.13 
However, CERCLA’s results have fallen well short of Congress’ 
anticipated goals.14 As a consequence, the federal government 
enacted section 198 of the Internal Revenue Code, to help curb the 
brownfield phenomenon.15 Section 198 of the Internal Revenue Code 
allows a tax deduction for brownfield remediation expenses.16 This 
incentive is designed to encourage private parties to pay for the 
 
 11. See R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup 
Legislation, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 101, 103 (1995). 
 12. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities Under 
the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993: A Promising Concept With Some 
Modifications, 11 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (1995). Specifically, the Omnibus Budget and 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 implemented federal participation in the establishment of enterprise 
communities and empowerment zones. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, § 13301-13303, 107 Stat. 312, 548-56 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 1391). 
 13. See, e.g., Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the 
Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1046-48 (1994) 
(explaining that Congress passed CERCLA to force polluters to pay the cost of the clean-up of 
contamination, rather than placing the burden on the taxpayers). 
 14. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of 
Failure, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165 (1993); Superfund Needs Reform to Speed Toxic 
Cleanup, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 2, 1994, at 10A. 
 15. Adam Gropper, Note, Getting the Green Back: Remediating Brownfields Under 
Internal Revenue Code § 198, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 281, 282 (1998). 
 16. I.R.C. § 198 (West Supp. 1998). 
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remediation costs, because the government lacks funds to finance the 
cleanup itself.17 
While brownfields remediation is of the utmost importance, the 
tax deduction strategy does not provide enough incentive to 
effectively accomplish urban redevelopment.18 The government 
should take affirmative action to provide real benefits to the 
remediator and ensure that the brownfield phenomenon is 
addressed.19 The current strategy of using a tax deferral as an 
incentive provides only a mediocre benefit to taxpayers who decide 
to remediate a brownfield site.20 
This Note discusses the potential consequences and drawbacks of 
the current tax treatment of environmental brownfields remediation. 
Part II provides a discussion of the applicable environmental clean-up 
mechanisms. Part III analyzes the tax treatment of environmental 
remediation projects. Part IV discusses problems with the current 
expensing of environmental remediation costs. Part V emphasizes the 
need for a thorough federalized approach. Finally, Part VI proposes a 
model federal tax credit program.  
 
 17. S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 110 (1997) (explaining expressing that the Senate Finance 
Committee enacted Code Section 198 “[t]o encourage the cleanup of contaminated sites” by 
private parties). See generally Steven G. Black, Note, The Continuing Saga of Environmental 
Clean up Costs: Current Deduction Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield-
Union, 4 BYU L. Rev. 1321, 1345-46 (1995). 
 18. In general, the more favorable the tax treatment, the more likely that the clean-up will 
be prompt and thorough. J. Andrew Hoerner, Tax Treatment of Environmental Cleanup Costs: 
An Environmental View, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 166-445 (1994). 
 19. See generally LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 
SUPERFUND: PRIVATE-SECTOR EXPENDITURES AND TRANSACTION COSTS 45 (1993) (citing 
problems with CERCLA enforcement due to its high transaction cost which prevent the 
intended benefit of CERCLA was not being realized). 
 20. See H.R. 4094, 105th Cong. (1998) (reporting on the Committee on Commerce is and 
the Committees on Ways and Means’ and Small Business’ consideration of an environmental 
remediation tax credit for the incurred costs of qualified contaminated sites). 
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II. CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP MECHANISMS 
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 198021 
In the wake of the Love Canal Disaster,22 Congress enacted the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).23 Congress designed CERCLA to 
clean up hazardous waste sites and to “find parties who could be held 
accountable to pay for such clean-ups.”24 In addition, CERCLA gives 
the EPA the authority to enforce a clean up effort in the event of 
“release or threat of release”25 of a “hazardous substance”26 from a 
 
 21. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1986). For a discussion on the congressional intent 
behind CERCLA, see Organ, supra note 13, at 1046-54. In general, Superfund was enacted to 
address the environmental contamination resulting from past waste disposal practices, that had 
previously gone unregulated. Id. at 1046-47. 
 22. From 1942 through 1953, the Hooker Chemical Company placed 21,000 tons of 
chemical waste in an abandoned hydroelectric channel in Love Canal, New York. See PETER S. 
MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 612-14 (1994). In 
1953, Hooker Chemical covered the site and sold the property to the Niagara Falls Board of 
Education for one dollar. Id. at 612. In turn, the Board of Education built a school and 
playground on the site, and used the surrounding land for residential purposes. Id. at 612-13. 
Subsequently, toxic chemicals were discovered to have seeped into the soil and groundwater, 
thus endangering the health and safety of the community. The incident received national media 
attention, causing New York’s health commissioner to declare a public emergency. Id. at 613. 
In March of 1998, twenty years after the fact, Occidental Petroleum, the successor to Hooker 
Chemical, paid compensation to 900 families for medical claims as well as an estimated $300 
million to the federal government and $78 million to New York state for cleaning up the site 
and relocating the families. See Coda for Love Canal: Last Suits are Resolved, NAT’L L.J., May 
11, 1998, at B2. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
 24. Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmental Liability and the Brownfields Phenomenon: An 
Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 66 (1996). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1994) (“[A]ny spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, 
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the 
environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed 
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant). . ..”). 
 26. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY, 286 (2d ed. 1996) (“EPA has listed more than 700 substances as ‘hazardous 
substances’ for purposes of CERCLA. 40 C.F.R. § 302.”); STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS, 305 (1997) (“The definition of ‘hazardous substance’ is 
very broad.”). CERCLA incorporates by reference the lists of hazardous chemicals in other 
federal statutes regulating toxic substances including the Clean Water Act, Solid Waste 
Disposal Act (RCRA), the Clean Air Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act. Eagle-Picher 
Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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“facility.”27  
CERCLA establishes a framework for dealing with potentially 
contaminated sites. First, the EPA must determine whether the site 
qualifies as a potentially contaminated site.28 Next the EPA must then 
decide if that site warrants placement on the National Priorities List 
(NPL) of the most dangerous hazardous waste sites, otherwise known 
as Superfund sites.29 After listing the site, the EPA may clean up the 
site or order any “potentially responsible party” (PRP) to remediate 
the site.30 
Six years after passing CERCLA, Congress enacted the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), establishing 
 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994):  
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, 
impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or 
aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, 
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include 
any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.  
 28. A potentially contaminated site is defined as “an imminent and substantial danger to 
the public health or welfare or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1994). 
 29. See Charles de Saillan, Superfund Reauthorization: A More Modest Proposal, 27 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,201 (1997); Frona M. Powell, Amending CERCLA to Encourage the 
Redevelopment of Brownfields: Issues, Concerns and Recommendations, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. 
& CONTEMP. L. 113, 115 (1998) (citing Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 221, 94 Stat. 2801. “In 
enacting CERCLA, Congress established a multibillion dollar fund (the ‘Superfund’) to help 
finance the clean up costs of such sites.”). Id. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). There are four classes of liable parties who may be 
obligated to either remediate the site or to reimburse others for the cost of remediation. The first 
class involves the current owner and operator of the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994). 
However, owners have a defense: the “innocent landowner” provisions establish protection 
from liability if the owner purchased without knowledge of the existence of contamination and 
conducted an inquiry at the time of purchase to determine whether contamination existed. 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(35) (1994); see, e.g., Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 
964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Serafini, 791 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Pa. 1993); New 
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 
1055 (D. N.J. 1981). The past owner or operator of a site falls under the second class of 
potentially responsible parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994); see, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William 
E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992). Persons who arranged for disposal of the 
hazardous substance that was disposed of at the site compromise the third class. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(3) (1994); see, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 
1995). Finally, the fourth class is comprised of any persons who transported the substances to 
the site if they were involved in the selection of that site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994); see, 
e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).  
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statutory clean-up standards for Superfund sites.31 The most 
significant change brought about by SARA was contained in § 121 of 
CERCLA, the imposition of remedial standards on CERCLA.32 
Under SARA § 113(h), the remediation must protect human health 
and the environment while being cost effective.33 
While Congress had high hopes for this legislation, the 
remediation projects have proceeded at a slow pace.34 The primary 
reason for this failure is the enormous cost of an environmental 
clean-up, averaging $30 million per Superfund site.35 Compounding 
the problem is the fact that transactional costs have depleted the 
amount of money available for remediation.36 In addition, squabbling 
amongst the PRPs as to what share of the clean-up cost is attributable 
to each and the difficulty in locating possible PRPs has led to further 
delays.37 
B. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
establishes regulatory requirements for the disposal of solid and 
hazardous waste.38 Congress enacted RCRA to complement 
CERCLA. While CERCLA is triggered when a toxic site exists, 
RCRA focusing on the handling of hazardous materials in order to 
prevent a toxic site from occurring.39 RCRA can also serve as a basis 
for compelling clean-up of contaminated property.40 
 
 31. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1994). 
 33. Id. § 9613(h). 
 34. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS AND 
CHALLENGE: EPA UPDATE (1989); see 140 CONG. REC. S12, 604-605 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 
1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
 35. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP: 
EPA’S FIRST TWO YEARS IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (1991). 
 36. MARK REISCH, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES IN THE 
103D CONGRESS (Congressional Research Service updated Oct. 5, 1994), at 2.  
 37. See, e.g., Sandy Shore, Environmental Detectives Track Down Polluters Superfund, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15 1995, at B5. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994). 
 39. Id. § 6902(a)(1). Subtitle C of RCRA defines the requirements for the disposal of 
hazardous wastes.  
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (1994) (authorizing the government to seek injunctive relief in 
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Although RCRA has no explicit cost recovery provisions, in 
United States v. Valentine,41 the District Court of Wyoming held that 
under RCRA § 6973(a), parties may recover past response costs for 
clean-up at solid waste management units.42 In addition, RCRA 
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) gives citizens standing to bring an action to abate an 
“imminent and substantial endangerment” due to the release of solid 
or hazardous waste.43 In fact, the Ninth Circuit in KFC Western. Inc. 
v. Meghrig44 went so far as to grant recovery of past response costs 
under § 7002(a)(1)(B).45 
III. TAX TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP 
In addition to environmental laws, the IRS attempts to assist 
remediation efforts by offering generous tax incentives for 
environmental clean-up.46 When determining the tax treatment of a 
transaction, the first question is whether the transaction at issue 
qualifies as a deduction or as a capital expenditure.47 
A. Deductions 
Generally, a taxpayer may deduct from his taxable income any 
and all expenses that he incurs in the day to day operation of his 
business.48 There are several requirements that must be met under 
section 162(a) for an expense to be deductible. The expense must be: 
(1) ordinary and necessary,49 (2) part of an ongoing trade or 
 
certain cases when there is an “imminent and substantial endangerment”). 
 41. 856 F. Supp. 627 (D. Wyo. 1994). 
 42. Id at 632. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
 44. 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 45. Id.; see, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1967 (1994) 
(holding that litigation-related attorney’s fees are not recoverable in private party cost recovery 
actions under CERCLA). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 110 (1997). 
 47. See April I. Halle, Clean-Up Costs: Deduction v. Capitalization Under Revenue 
Ruling 94-38, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 591, 592 (1995) (noting that the IRS seeks to “match expenses 
with the revenues of the taxable period to which the expenses are properly attributable to avoid 
distortion of net income”). 
 48. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994), provides for the deduction of all “ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.” 
 49. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1933) (defining “ordinary and 
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business,50 (3) paid or incurred in the tax year,51 and (4) an expense 
(as opposed to capital expenditure).52 Although section 162(a) allows 
the deduction of “expenses,” I.R.C. section 263 mandates a different 
treatment for “capital expenditures.”53 
B. Capitalization 
The objective of the capitalization requirement is to portray the 
taxpayer’s income most accurately by matching expenses to related 
income.54 Courts have enumerated that capital expenditures are those 
that (1) “add to the value” of the property;55 (2) “substantially 
 
necessary” as that which is customary or typical); Comm’r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) 
(holding that unusual or infrequent expenses can be ordinary and necessary if they are incurred 
by average taxpayers in a particular type of business). See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & 
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS § 20.1.1 (1988); 
see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1994) (providing that a taxpayer may generally deduct the costs 
of incidental materials and supplies). Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 provides that a taxpayer does not 
have to capitalize the cost of incidental repairs that do not materially increase the value or the 
useful life of the repaired property. See generally Gilliam v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. 515 (1986).  
 50. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 49, at § 20.4.4 (explaining that expenses in 
preparation for a new trade or business may not be deductible); Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191, 
194 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (stating that there can be no trade or business unless the taxpayer enters 
into and carries on the activity with a good faith purpose of turning a profit or in the belief that 
a profit can be made from the activity).  
 51. Determination of the time at which an expense was incurred is determined by the 
accounting method of the taxpayer. Expenses by taxpayers using a “cash” method of accounting 
are generally incurred in the year in which the money is actually spent. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
1(a)(1) (1954). Expenses by taxpayers using the “accrual” method are not incurred until the 
“economic performance” has occurred. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1954). The “economic 
performance” test means that an accrual basis taxpayer cannot deduct expenditures until the 
money is paid or services are actually performed. See I.R.C. § 468(a)(1) (1994).  
 52. I.R.C. § 162 (1994). 
 53. Ordinary expenses that produce a benefit in the year incurred are deductible in that 
year. See Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974); United States v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 
405 U.S. 298 (1972). Capital expenditures are for items with a fixed life that produce a long 
term benefit over many years. See Encyclopedia Britannica v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 
1982); Halle, Note, supra note 47, at 594. 
 54. See Rev. Rul. 94-38; Juliann Avakian-Martin & Marlis Carson, Environmental 
Cleanup Issue: A Repeating Theme at ABA Meeting, 60 TAX NOTES 925, 925 (1993) (“if the 
benefits point more to the future than to the past, then capitalization will be required”) (quoting 
Glenn R. Carrington); see, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 
1982). See generally Donal E. Flannery et al., KPMG Peat Marwick Advocates Current 
Deductibility of Environmental Cleanup Costs, 7 NAT. RESOURCES TAX REV. 1272, 1273 
(1994).  
 55. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994) (stating that “incidental repairs” are deductible as 
ordinary and necessary if the purpose of the expenditure is to keep the property in an ordinarily 
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prolong the useful life” of the property;56 or (3) “adapt property to a 
new or different use”57 from its previous use.58 Section 263 prohibits 
the deduction of costs incurred for new buildings or for permanent 
improvements that increase the value of any property.59 Such 
expenses are regarded as capital expenditures. 
If an expense qualifies as a capital expenditure, the expenditure 
must be depreciated as a cost allocated over the period that 
corresponds to the benefit of the expenditure.60 If the capital 
expenditure is for property that does not have a determinable life, 
such as land,61 the taxpayer adds the capital expenditure to the basis 
and recovers the cost either when the property is sold or exchanged, 
or upon the dissolution of the enterprise.62 
1. Repair vs. Improvement 
A common method of distinguishing between a deductible 
expense and one requiring capitalization, is the determination of 
whether that expense was an improvement or repair.63 Improvements 
include expenses that substantially increase the useful life and alter 
the property’s capacity or the function of an asset; these expenses are 
 
efficient operating condition). 
 56. Compare I.M. Cowell v. Comm’r, 18 B.T.A. 997 (1930) (holding that expenditures 
made for modifying a hotel building that was incurred as a part of a plan to rehabilitate and 
improve the building had to be capitalized), with Buckland v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 681 
(D. Conn. 1946) (holding that the expenses incurred in repairing a building to prevent leaks was 
deductible). 
 57. Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-110-02 (Nov. 19, 1993). 
 58. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (1994). 
 59. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1994); see Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) 
(stating that “deductions are exceptions from the norm of capitalization”); see also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.263(a)-1(b) (1994). 
 60. I.R.C. § 263(a) (1994); Comm’r v. Boylston Market Ass’n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 
1942) (holding that if a taxpayer prepays an expense that is attributable to subsequent years, 
that expense must be capitalized). 
 61. Edinboro Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (noting that 
land has an unlimited useful life). 
 62. The basis in realty may include the original purchase price, transfer taxes, legal 
expenses and title search. In addition, capital improvements such as the grading of the land may 
also be added to the basis. See I.R.C. §§ 164(a), 263(a)(1), 1016(a)(1) (1994); Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.212-1(k), 1.263(a)-1(a)(1), 1.263(a)-2(a), and 1.1016-2(a) (1994). 
 63. BITTKER & LOKKEN, § 20.4.8.  
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generally capitalized.64 Alternatively, expenses made to restore 
property damage and incidental repairs are generally deductible.65 
Since all repairs add some long-term value to the property, discerning 
the threshold at which a repair becomes an improvement is difficult.66 
The Internal Revenue Service makes this determination on a fact and 
circumstance basis.67 
2. “Future Benefits” 
In INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,68 the Supreme Court adopted 
the “future benefits” rationale for determining whether an 
expenditure should be deducted or capitalized.69 In INDOPCO, the 
taxpayer incurred investment banker’s fees and related costs in 
connection with a friendly merger offer by another firm.70 The 
taxpayer, pointing out that no separate and identifiable asset had been 
created to which such outlays could be allocated, sought to deduct 
rather than capitalize.71 The Court held that the merger produced 
 
 64. See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 333, 337 (1962); see also Treas. 
Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(a) (2000); see, e.g., Mt. Morris Drive-In Theater Co. v. Comm’r, 238 F.2d 85 
(6th Cir. 1956). In Mt. Morris, the court denied the taxpayer was denied a current deduction for 
the cost of a drainage system it installed to stop run-off to nearby land. The taxpayer argued that 
the installation of the drainage system was a repair; the court ruled, however, that the need for a 
drainage system was foreseeable at the time the taxpayer constructed the drive-in theater. 
Consequently, the cost of the drainage system had to be capitalized. Id. 
 65. Plainfield, 39 T.C. at 338. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (2000) (explaining that repairs 
can be deducted currently if they do not add to the life of the asset); see also Midland Empire 
Packing Co. v. Comm’r, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) (question of whether the cost of lining basement 
walls with concrete to prevent oil seepage created by a neighboring refinery should be treated as 
a deductible repair or as a capital expenditure). The walls of the basement which had been used 
for twenty-five years had proved entirely effective in keeping out moisture until the refinery 
went up, at which point the seepage began. Id. The court held that the expenditure was a repair 
and was deductible. Id. 
 66. Steven G. Black, The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup Costs: Current 
Deduction Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield-Union, 4 BYU L. REV. 1321, 
1324 (1995). 
 67. See, e.g., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 68. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
 69. For an early proposal of the test, see George Mundstock, Taxation of Business 
Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1237 (1987); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. 
Schenk, How To Tax the House that Jack Built, 43 TAX L.REV. 447 (1988). 
 70. 503 U.S. at 82. 
 71. Id. at 86 (advocating a “test in which ‘creation or enhancement of an asset’ is a 
prerequisite to capitalization, and deductibility under § 162(a) is the rule rather than the 
exception”). 
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“significant benefits,” which would be realized by the taxpayer in 
future years.72 Consequently, the fees had to be capitalized.73 In 
reaching its decision, the Court focused on the long term benefits the 
company received by being acquired.74 The Court stated, however, 
that, while the expenditure need not have a determinable life, the 
mere presence of an incidental benefit may not warrant 
capitalization.75 Rather, the crucial factor in determining the 
appropriate tax treatment of the expenditure is the taxpayer’s 
realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditures 
were made.76 
C. Refundable Tax Credits 
A tax credit provides a dollar for dollar reduction in one’s tax 
liability. In other words, a tax credit reduces the amount of taxes due 
because the credit amount is subtracted after the applicable tax rate 
has been multiplied by the income.77 By contrast, deductions reduce 
taxable income and thereby reduce the tax payable by the amount of 
the deduction multiplied by the relevant rate of tax.78 Unlike a tax 
credit, which remains constant regardless of the rate of tax, a 
deduction benefits the taxpayer to the extent of that taxpayer’s tax 
bracket.79 
In a refundable tax credit, the amount of credit gathered by the 
taxpayer can be redeemed through the Internal Revenue Service for a 
refund.80 In contrast, a nonrefundable tax credit does not entitle a 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 90. 
 74. Id. at 86-87 (contrasting the instant case to Lincoln Savings which held that an 
“expenditure that ignores to create or enhance . . . a separate and distinct “asset should be 
capitalized,” but did not create an exclusive set). 
 75. Id. at 87.  
 76. Id. 
 77. John F. Dooling et al., Deductions, Exemptions, and Credits, in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FEDERAL TAXATION 106 (Erwin N. Griswold & William C. Warren eds., 1948). See generally 
PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION 326 (1980) (discussing 
of investment tax credits); WILLIAM O. GREEN & ANN H. GREEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX 49 
(1976); JAMES EDWARD MAULE, TAX CREDITS: CONCEPTS & CALCULATIONS A-8 (1994). 
 78. See Dooling, supra note 77, at 103. 
 79. Id. at 106. 
 80. Id. 
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taxpayer to a refund if the credit exceeds the tax that would otherwise 
be owed by the taxpayer.81 
D. Section 198 
Section 198 permits taxpayers to deduct expenditures on 
brownfield environmental remediation in the year paid or incurred, 
instead of capitalizing the expenditure. Capitalizing the expenditure 
would be traditional tax policy treatment.82 The reason for this 
difference is that environmental remediation produces benefits that 
last longer than one year.83 However, in order to receive the 
deduction under section 198, the remediation must be of “hazardous 
substances”84 at a “qualified contaminated site.”85 
Prior to the enactment of section 198, environmental remediation 
expenditures left taxpayers confused as to whether they should 
deduct or capitalize the expenditure.86 Section 198 paints a clearer 
picture regarding the tax treatment of brownfield remediation, but 
does not address various other clean-up situations.87 
 
 81. Janette M. Lohman & Paul N. Tice, Beyond the Beltway: Using Tax Credits to 
Implement Public Policy: The Missouri Experiment, AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY 
DEV. L., 284, 287 (1999). 
 82. I.R.C. § 198(a) (1999). 
 83. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 84. I.R.C. § 198(d)(1)(A-B) (1999) (defining hazardous substance as “any substance . . . 
defined in § 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, and any substance which is designated as a hazardous substance under 
Section 102 of such Act”). 
 85. I.R.C. § 198(c)(1)(A) (1999). A qualified contaminated site is defined as any area that:  
(i) is held by the taxpayer for use in a trade or business or for the production of 
income, or which is property described in Section 1221(1) in the hands of the taxpayer; 
(ii) which is within a targeted area; and (iii) at or on which there has been a release (or 
threat of release) or disposal of any hazardous substance. 
Id. 
 86. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-I C.B.35 (allowing current deduction for asbestos 
removal). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 94-11-002 (Nov. 19, 1993) (requiring capitalization for 
remediation of contaminated soil). 
 87. H.R. REP. CONF. REP. NO. 105-220, at 488 (1997) (stating that “providing current 
deductions for certain environmental remediation expenditures under the conference agreement 
creates no inference as to the proper treatment of other remediation expenditures not prescribed 
in the agreement”). 
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT EXPENSING OF BROWNFIELD 
REMEDIATION COSTS 
By allowing an immediate deduction of the costs associated with 
remediation of brownfields, the Senate Finance Committee created 
incentives to clean-up contaminated sites.88 The general drawback to 
the tax deduction strategy was that it provided more dollar benefits to 
high-bracket taxpayers than to low-bracket taxpayers, defeating the 
“vertical equity”89 goal of the tax system.90 The fact that deductions 
had to be itemized also indicated that such a method would be 
primarily used by high-bracket taxpayers.91 
Congress has apparently not learned its lesson from the 
controversy surrounding CERCLA.92 CERCLA, although 
comprehensive and strict, never realized its projected potential and 
the results have been dismissed.93 A deduction for the remediation of 
brownfields is really just a tax deferral system, which ultimately does 
not provide the incentive needed for a taxpayer to take on the table of 
brownfields remediation.94 
The reason why the section 198 tax “deduction” functions as a tax 
deferral relates to section 198’s reference to section 1245.95 Section 
1245 states that a gain on the sale of certain property is taxed as 
ordinary income for the amount of all depreciation or amortization 
deductions previously taken on the property.96 Section 198 states that 
 
 88. S. REP NO. 105-33, at 110 (1997); see, e.g., Lawrence J. Arem, Tax Benefits of 
Research and Development Expenses Increased by New Credit, TAXATION FOR LAWYERS, Jan.-
Feb. 1982, at 208. 
 89. Harold S. Peckron, Reparation Payments–An Exclusion Revisited, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 
705, 714 n.58 (2000) (citing J.S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS 
AND MATERIALS 24-25 (1998)). Vertical equity is a distribution of the tax burden so that those 
with the greatest ability to pay will pay the most tax, and those with the least ability to pay will 
pay the least tax. Id. 
 90. See 129 CONG. REC. S2387 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1983) (statement by Prof. Rabushka) 
(stating that the wealthy taxpayers are the one who benefit from deductions). 
 91. Cf. Tax Subsidies: They Just Keep Climbing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 21, 
1983, at 75.  
 92. See McGee, supra note 14. 
 93. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14, 736 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 94. See, e.g., Nancy E. Schurtz, Promoting Alcohol Fuels Production: Tax Expenditures? 
Direct Expenditures? No Expenditures?, 36 SW. L.J. 597, 633-34 (1982). 
 95. I.R.C. § 198(e) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 96. I.R.C. § 1245(a) (1994).  
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any cost expensed under section 198 will be treated as a depreciation 
deduction attributable to section 1245 property.97 Thus, the deduction 
taken in the year of the expenditure is recaptured and taxed as 
ordinary income in the year of the sale, making section 198 function 
only as a tax deferral, instead of a deduction. The investor will be 
better off investing in the greenfield because he will not have to incur 
any remediation expenses.98 In sum, a brownfield investment will 
actually be more expensive for the investor than an investment in a 
greenfield,99 and there is no real incentive for the investor to act in 
the manner prescribed by Congress through section 198.100 
Although Congress had high expectations when it added section 
198 to the tax code in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,101 section 198 
was not nearly as strong an incentive as it could have been. CERCLA 
imposed a comprehensive strict liability standard; thus, Congress was 
enacting enforcement of the strongest caliber.102 By investing in a 
brownfield, the investor will always be liable for any cleanup costs 
arising in the future, by virtue of CERCLA’s strict liability.103 This is 
merely a tax deferral, which is definitely not the strongest tax 
incentive available to Congress.104 Thus, Congress needs to take more 
affirmative steps by sharing the costs of such remediation and by 
 
 97. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(A)-(B)(i) (1994). Properties affected include: (1) tangible and 
intangible property and (2) other tangible property (not including a building or its structural 
components) used as a central part of (a) manufacturing, (b) production, (c) extraction, or (d) 
the furnishing of transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, or sewage 
disposal services. Id. 
 98. See Robert S. Berger et al., Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the 
Challenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 73 (1995).  
 99. See Clement Dinsmore, Recycling Brownfields: The Legislative Climate, J. URB. 
TECH., Spring 1995, at 9 (defining greenfields as land which has never been used for a non-
agricultural purpose).  
 100. See S. REP NO. 105-33, at 110 (1997); H. R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 487 (1997). 
 101. One estimate suggested that $100 billion in taxes could be generated by the use of 
brownfield sites. Administration of Brownfields Program Questioned at Hill Appropriations 
Hearing, 27 Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2511 (Apr. 18, 1997). 
 102. See TODD S. DAVIS & KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 7 (1997). 
 103. See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 22-37.  
 104. See Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time vs. Periodic An Economic Analysis 
of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX L. REV. 305, 308 n.18 (1994) (explaining that a tax 
credit is considered a valuable tax subsidy because it offers a dollar for dollar reductions in the 
amount of taxes a company will pay). 
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lessening the fear the investor has of CERCLA’s strict and retroactive 
liability.105 
A. What Level of Remediation is Adequate? 
One of potential investors’ greatest fears of is CERCLA’s liability 
subsequent to the remediation efforts.106 The level of remediation 
needed to viably restore a brownfield site is based on contamination 
levels, which are sometimes calculated imperfectly.107 Such potential 
miscalculations pose the problem of assigning future liability if 
additional contamination is later discovered.108 Current law allocates 
any future liability to the owner/taxpayer109 and requires that the 
owner demonstrate due diligence in looking for additional 
contamination.110 Though this arrangement does function to ensure 
that the initial remediation will be done thoroughly, it also 
discourages brownfield investment.111 
However, if a full remediation waiver were given to the owners of 
brownfields, they would not need to show due diligence in finding 
any further contamination. Thus, if further contamination were 
subsequently found, the government would assume liability for 
further remediation.112 This method would require the government to 
potentially incur costs in the future, but it would also encourage 
wider investment in troubled brownfield sites.113 
 
 105. Al Stamborski, More Incentives from the Government Would Help the Development of 
Brownfield Sites in the Metro East, Developers Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 21, 2000, 
at BP10. One EPA official commented, “In dealing with brownfields, it’s not so much that 
people are adverse to taking on the environmental issues . . . Its not knowing about them that 
scares them.” Id.  
 106. See DAVIS & MARGOLIS, supra note 102, at 9. 
 107. See Philip H. Gitlen, Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 1 ALBANY L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 
28 (1995). 
 108. See Krista J. Ayers, Comment, The Potential For Future Use Analysis in Superfund 
Remediation Programs, 44 EMORY L.J. 1503, 1509 (1995). 
 109. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).  
 111. The taxpayer/owner will want to avoid expensive future liability, and thus ensure that 
the remediation efforts were done thoroughly. 
 112. The government would not have to assume the remediation cost of the later found 
contamination if it can locate PRPs and prosecute them under CRECLA § 121. 
 113. See Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State Brownfields Recycling and 
Federal Enterprise Zoning, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 495, 498 (1998) (“brownfields . . . 
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The current system will discourage investment in brownfield 
sites.114 Investors fear the possibility of future liability; therefore, this 
system will negate whatever effects Congress intended to have with 
section 198 of the tax code.115 By allowing a deduction for the 
remediation of a brownfield site, we should also exclude the taxpayer 
from any future liability.116 
Many states have adopted a “no action” letter policy, which 
waives CERCLA liability if the cleanup meets state certification 
standards.117 The state with the broadest waiver of liability is 
Michigan.118 Michigan has restructured its CERCLA law “to provide 
blanket protection from liability to an owner of a property that is not 
responsible for causing the contamination at the brownfield site.”119 
 
ultimate goal [is] a dramatic improvement in the social climate and financial status of central-
city residents”).  
 114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 115. Cf. Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, 10 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 22 (1996) (stating that the high cost of conducting site investigation and 
remediation is a major discouragement to investment in brownfields). 
 116. The tax deduction provides recognition that the remediation was sufficient, and thus, 
the remediator has complied with the guidelines set forth by the EPA. 
 117. A release of liability or no action letter is available in: Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, and Washington. Joel B. Eisen, ‘Brownfields of Dreams’?: Challenges and Limits of 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 951 (1995).  
 118. Id. at 950. 
 119. Id. (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.20126(1) (West Supp. 1996)). The 
Michigan statute states in pertinent part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and except as provided in 
subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) and section 20128, the following persons are liable 
under this part: 
 (a) The owner or operator of a facility if the owner or operator is responsible for an 
activity causing a release or threat of release. 
 (b) The owner or operator of a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous 
substance if the owner or operator is responsible for an activity causing a release or 
threat of release.  
 (c) An owner or operator of a facility who becomes an owner or operator on or after 
June 5, 1995, unless the owner or operator complies with both of the following: 
 (i) A baseline environmental assessment is conducted prior to or within 45 days after 
the earlier of the date of purchase, occupancy, or foreclosure. For purposes of this 
section, accessing property to conduct a baseline environmental assessment does not 
constitute occupancy. 
 (ii) The owner or operator discloses the results of a baseline environmental 
assessment to the department and subsequent purchaser or transferee if the baseline 
environmental assessment confirms that the property is a facility. 
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The EPA should encourage federal application of the Michigan 
liability waiver.120 As investors and developers abstain from 
brownfields development due to liability fears, the no action letter is 
a step in the right direction. Indeed, inner-city revitalization will 
likely gain new life if the Michigan program is implemented 
uniformly in every state because potential investors will be free from 
the specter subsequent CERCLA liability.121  
However, the no action letter is a release of liability only from the 
issuing state.122 In addition, if further contamination is subsequently 
discovered, the no action letter does not prevent CERCLA liability 
from being imposed.123 In sum, the no action letter is of uncertain 
value to the investor.124 If read in the most favorable light for a 
taxpayer, section 198 is merely a tax deferral system.125 The primary 
benefit of the deferral to the taxpayer who outlays the funds for 
remediation is the time value of money.126 
The legislature’s goal is for private money to fund brownfield 
remediation so that the government does not have to exhaust its 
limited resources.127 The tax system is designed to be a revenue 
 
Id. 
 120. See generally supra note 115 (describing the Michigan liability waiver). 
 121. See Eisen, supra note 117, at 952-56 (stating that the no action letter gives the 
developer assurance that the state will not pursue any enforcement actions at the site). 
 122. See id. at 954 n.303 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE 
STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES 20 
(1995)); Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative, 10 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 22, 25 (1996); R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration and 
Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 105, 134 (1995). 
 123. See Eisen, supra note 117, at 955 n.304 (stating that a no action letter should have a 
“reopener” provision to empower the issuing state to take action if contamination that was not 
discovered during the site investigation is subsequently found); see also id. at 1033. 
 124. See generally id. at 955 n.308, citing Hearing Before Subcommittee On Conference, 
Trade, and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995) 
(testimony of Jan Linsenmeyer and Robert Atkinson, Energy, Transportation and Infrastructure 
Program, Office of Technology, stating that the no action letter is nothing more than a marginal 
incentive to invest in brownfields). 
 125. See Taxation Subsidiaries, supra note 91. 
 126. See, e.g., Stephen J. Wolma, Ambushed in a Safe Harbor: Taxation of Intrafamilial 
Installment Sales Contracts, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 316-18 (1998) (describing methods for 
calculating the value of money over time).  
 127. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV. 
85, 94 (1985) (stating that a reduction in private funding would cause the government to 
subsidize charitable and public service organizations).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/14
p371 note Haque book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing 389 
 
 
source for the federal government.128 Under the section 198 deduction 
method enacted by Congress, the only loss the government will 
realize is delay of tax receipts which will be lower due to the time 
value of money.129 
There is no true benefit for an investor to incur the cost to 
rehabilitate a brownfield and be able to deduct the costs involved, 
when the taxpayer can invest in a greenfield and not have to incur 
any remediation cost.130 Furthermore, the problem is compounded by 
the fact that section 198 expenses are recaptured and taxed as 
ordinary income at the time of sale.131 Therefore, any benefit the 
investor did acquire by the remediation effort is taken away at the 
sale or exchange of the property.132 
V. THE NEED FOR A THOROUGH FEDERALIZED BROWNFIELD 
REMEDIATION APPROACH 
The federal government should view the redevelopment of inner-
cities as a business investment.133 Remediating brownfields and 
returning them to productive use will attract more businesses to 
newly decontaminated sites.134 New businesses will lead to increased 
job opportunities for local residents.135 As a result, the federal, state, 
 
 128. See William A. Klein & Joseph Bankman, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 (11th ed. 
1997) (stating that 86.1% of the total revenues taken in by the federal government were 
composed of income taxes).  
 129. See Wolma, supra note 126.  
 130. For a discussion of costs associated with investment in brownfields as opposed to 
greenfields, see McWilliams, supra note 7; Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save 
Greenfields: Shifting the Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 
27 CONN. L. REV. 789, 792 (1995).  
 131. See I.R.C. § 198(e) (West Supp. 1998).   
 132. See id.  
 133. Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate Social 
Responsibility In The New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 73 (2000) (citing U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF THE CITIES (1998) (the availability of jobs and 
other public initiatives is needed to revitalize the inner city); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEV., THE STATE OF THE CITIES (1997); CITIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL, 
A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH BRONX 
(1998)). 
 134. See, e.g., Al Stamborski, Brownfield Incentives Program Saved 140 Jobs in Jennings, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 21, 2000, at BP10 (stating that the redevelopment of a 
brownfield site will double the employment of Stout Marketing in the coming decade). 
 135. See, e.g., id. 
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and local governments will profit by an increased tax base.136 Thus, 
the revitalized inner-city will be a boon for jobs, reducing the need 
for social services within depressed areas.137 
Brownfield sites will have a better chance of being redeveloped if 
the government can offer more tax incentives to private parties who 
are willing to clean-up the sites.138 Thus far, federal, state, and local 
governments have made substantial efforts to encourage 
redevelopment of brownfields.139 Investors want the government to 
share a greater burden of the costs associated with remediation, as 
well as to provide them with security from the far-reaching grasps of 
CERCLA liability.140 
VI. THE MODEL FEDERAL TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 
Some states are currently utilizing the tax credit incentive for 
remediation of brownfields.141 However, these credits are only 
applicable to one’s state tax liability.142 A substantial federal tax 
credit program would provide a more attractive incentive because 
federal tax liabilities are normally much higher than state tax 
liabilities.143 Although this proposed federal tax credit program would 
result in a considerable decrease in tax revenues for the treasury, it 
would stimulate future growth. In time, the initial loss of revenue 
 
 136. See generally John Machaleh & Jon Frondsent, Republican Proposes Federal Aid for 
Contaminated Land, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 26, 1996 (claiming that the failure to 
redevelop abandoned industrial sites is costing states and cities hundreds of millions and 
possibly billions of dollars in lost tax revenues).  
 137. See Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax 
Policy Got To Do With It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759 (1999). 
 138. Al Stamborski, More Incentives from the Government Would Help the Development of 
Brownfield Sites in the Metro East, Developers Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 21, 2000, 
at BP10. “[D]evelopers . . . want a crack at the grant money that’s now available only to local 
governments.” Id. 
 139. See Eisen, supra note 117, at 1033 n.20 (citing NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
INSTITUTE, HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN?: WHITE PAPER ON BROWNFIELDS 38 (1998)). 
 140. See DAVIS & MARGOLIS, supra note 102. 
 141. See Lohman, supra note 81, at 294 n.6 (stating that Missouri is not the only state that 
has experimented with transferable tax credit programs).  
 142. Id. at 287 (stating that state tax “credits may offset the gross premiums tax, the 
financial institutions tax, the corporate franchise tax, the state income tax, and the express 
company gross receipts tax”).  
 143. Federal income tax paid is deducted from the state tax liability. 
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would be offset by the benefits of brownfield revitalization.144 
Congress should implement a federal tax credit to subsidize half 
of the costs associated with the remediation effort.145 A percentage 
would be more useful to determine the credit amount than a concrete 
number because the remediation costs vary from site to site.146 
Furthermore, a uniform percentage will better achieve the goal of 
providing the same benefit to all investors.147 The remaining half of 
the remediation costs should then be deductible under section 198.148 
Under this method, the investor would not incur any out-of-pocket 
expenses in conducting the remediation. However, by virtue of the 
recapture provision of section 198, the treasury will recover half of 
the remediation cost that was deducted in the year of sale of the 
property.149 This proposed method would effectively correct the 
impotent deduction offered under section 198.150 Furthermore, this 
method would utilize section 198 to its fullest potential.151 Although 
section 198 was passed with the best of intentions, its end-around 
incentive method of treating the deduction as analogous to that of 
depreciation expenses is not compelling enough to convince investors 
to remediate a brownfield site.152 
The EPA and federal government should urge states to offer a 
loan to investors for the redevelopment of the outdated facilities on 
 
 144. With the addition of new businesses generating new revenue, the tax base would 
increase which would result in increased tax revenue for the treasury. 
 145. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As A Device For Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 713-17 
(1970) (stating that tax incentives are used in achieving a desired result, a public good). 
“Frequently a tax incentive is urged on the ground that the particular problem to be met is great 
and that the Government must assist in its solution by enlisting the participation of the private 
sector—generally business.” Id. at 715-16. The advantages of a tax credit are enormous because 
once the program is put into effect, the results are near automatic and immediate. Id. at 716. 
 146. Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 581, 584-87 (1995) (stating that each site should be evaluated separately due to 
the distinct characteristics of each site). 
 147. S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 110 (1997) (stating the need for a clear and consistent standard 
for the appropriate tax treatment of environmental remediation expenditures). 
 148. See supra Part III.D.  
 149. See I.R.C. § 198(e) (West 1999). 
 150. See supra Part IV. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
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brownfields.153 Most brownfields have been abandoned for years and 
the buildings residing upon them are outdated.154 The state would be 
receiving a substantial tax benefit through the remediation of 
brownfields.155 Having the state offer the loan for the redevelopment 
project allows the costs of brownfield remediation projects to be 
shared by state and federal governments. 
Critics could argue that this federal tax incentive model is offering 
more than the government can afford to give. However, investors will 
not invest in brownfields when they can invest in greenfields and 
incur no extra expenses by way of remediation costs or for fear of 
future liability.156 Therefore, the government must shoulder the 
remediation costs by way of incentives to make investments in 
brownfields a profitable alternative. 
 
 153. See Rimer, supra note 24, at 117-18 (stating that loans are less burdensome to the 
government than grants). A drawback listed for loans is that the fear of subsequent 
environmental liability will deter potential investors from incurring such a heavy debt. Id. at 
118. However, a loan in the context of the proposal in this Note does not require a loan be the 
sole incentive for brownfield remediation. In fact, the loan in this context would be used for the 
rehabilitation of old and outdated facilities located on the brownfield site. Thus, the loan would 
be a complementary incentive to the one provided by the federal government. Id. 
 154. See id. at 68 n.18. 
[D]ecades of heavy industry in an era with limited environmental awareness have left a 
legacy of contaminated, often abandoned, industrial structures located on millions of 
acres of polluted land throughout the United States. The huge, empty shells of heavy 
industry in urban industrial centers are viewed as casualties of a shift in America’s 
industrial base toward light manufacturing, and a related shift away from rail and 
waterway transport to interstate highways. In the shadow of these aging behemoths 
stand the remains of many secondary facilities that once fed off the work generated by 
them. Closed paint shops, plating shops, and other assorted “job shops” litter the inner-
city with their own histories of contamination. Also gone are the businesses that relied 
on worker-generated consumer demand, such as gas stations and dry cleaners; these 
now sit idle due to releases or suspected releases of the hazardous materials endemic to 
their operations. The result is an urban environment where soil contamination is 
presumed, where groundwater and surface water pollution are likely, and where the 
“polluter pays” principle is failing to generate sufficient funds to clean up the mess. 
Id. citing Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: 
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 714-15 (1994) 
(citation omitted). 
 155. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra Part I. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Tax incentives generally benefit the rich tremendously more than 
they do the poor, violating the vertical equity goal of the tax system. 
However, the tax incentive proposed by this note is pointed towards 
the redevelopment of inner-city brownfield sites, and will translate to 
an increase in the number of jobs available to the residents of the 
area. Nonetheless, a strong and uniform program must be 
implemented before we can reach our goal of a pollutant-free society. 
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